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nation as a whole might well benefit were insurance companies with their vast
influence in the commercial and industrial life of the country to have a financial
stake in the success of interracial housing projects.
THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN SOUTHERN PRIMARIES
Four years ago South Carolina made the latest move in the game of constitu-
tional chess which the southern states have long been playing with the Supreme
Court on the question of the "white primary." The South Carolina legislature
repealed every statute relating in any way to primary elections or political
parties,' and proposed a constitutional amendment, 2subsequently ratified3 by
the voters at the general election of i944, which eliminated every reference to
"primary" and "political party" in the state constitution. The Democratic
state convention then met and adopted a set of regulations embodying virtually
all the provisions previously contained in the repealed statutes. By this action
it was hoped to circumvent the rulings in Smith v. Allwright4 and United States v.
Classic,s and thus enable the Democratic Party, in the guise of a private club, to
retain an all-white primary. In an action for a declaratory judgment to deter-
mine the rights of Negro voters under the new primary rules, the federal district
court held that in the South Carolina Democratic convention the "people of the
State... had enacted" what amounted to "custom, usage, or regulation" of
the state, and that such state action depriving the Negro plaintiff and others
similarly situated of the right to vote violated the Fifteenth Amendment of the
federal Constitution.6 On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the decision, but on
the ground that the South Carolina primary is an integral, inseparable part of
the election machinery of the state, and when party officials deny the Negro a
vote in what is a part of the state's election machinery, they are exercising state
power for an unconstitutional purpose. Rice v. Elmore.7
and Alexandria, Virginia and has over $200,000,000 invested in housing. Metropolitan Life
Makes Housing Pay, 33 Fortune 133 (April, 1946). Its Parkchester Project in New York is
the best-paying investment that it has. Ibid., at 134. Since the New York Redevelopment
Companies Law, § 3408, permits the corporate owner of a housing project to earn 6% on its
investment it is particularly interesting to note that Metropolitan reported to the New York
Insurance Commission in 1946 that its income from all assets averaged exactly 3%. PM, § i, p.
iI, col. 3 (July 30, 1947). Metropolitan has constantly earned its statutory 6% on its New
York and other housing projects. Metropolitan Life Makes Housing Pay, 33 Fortune 133,
209 (April, 1946).
1 S.C. Acts Extra. Sess. 1944, Nos. 688-839. In 1943 the Legislature had repealed forty-five
code provisions governing the conduct of the primary effective June 1, 1944. S.C. Acts 1943,
No. 63.
2S.C. Acts Extra. Sess. i944, No. 83o.
3S.C. Acts 1945
, 
No. xi, whereby the amendment to Article 1I, § io of the Constitution
was adopted by the voters at the general election of 1944.
4 321 U.S. 649 (1944). S3I 3 U.S. 299 (1941).6Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (S.C., 1947), aff'd on other grounds, Rice v. Elmore,
165 F. 2d 3 87(C.C.A. 4th, i947), noted in 33 Iowa L. Rev. 412 (1948).
7 Rice v. Elmore, i65 F. 2d 3 87(C.C.A. 4th, 1947), cert. den. 16 U.S.L. Week 3314 (1948).
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To frustrate each of the long succession of attempts to keep the Negro from
voting, the courts have relied upon two major weapons: "state action" and the
"right to vote." Racial discrimination in any election by organs of a state is
labeled "state action" in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments. But acts of individuals which are not "state action" may still be unlawful
if they deprive a qualified elector of the "right to vote" in contravention of the
federal Constitutions and the Civil Rights Act.9 To meet each new southern
attempt at Negro disfranchisement the federal courts have either had to dis-
cover "state action" where none had been found before, or to broaden the pro-
tection extended to the "right to vote" by the Constitution.
The first of these methods has been called into play more frequently. The
"grandfather clauses" ° were declared unconstitutional as thinly disguised legis-
lative attempts at disfranchisement.- Next, it was held that a state law directly
forbidding Negroes to vote in Democratic primaries violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.z Southern efforts then turned to attempts at divorcing the act of
discrimination from any recognized state activity. But the discriminatory regu-
lations of the Texas Democratic state executive committee, when authorized
by the legislature to prescribe the qualifications for voting in the Democratic
primary, were struck down by the Supreme Court as "state action."'' ' Not long
8 The federal right to vote stems from Article I, Sections 2 and 4, and the Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments to the Constitution. For the purpose of
this discussion the most pertinent provisions are those of Art. I, §§ 2 and 4.
Art. I, § 2: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."
Art. I, § 4: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Repre-
sentatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may
at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of Chusing Sena-
tors."
9 The criminal provisions of the Civil Rights Acts are Sections i9 and 20 of the Criminal
Code, 35 Stat. 1o92 (i909), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 51, 52 (1927). Section 5i provides: "If two or more
persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or because of his having so exercised the same,. . . they shall be fined not more than
$5,000 and imprisoned not more than ten years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible
to any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the
United States."
Section 52 provides: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, wilfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory,
or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties,
on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are pre-
scribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $r,ooo, or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both."
10 These clauses set up a literacy qualification for voting, excusing from the qualification
those who had been entitled to vote in 1867 and their descendants, and Civil War veterans and
their descendants.
11 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (19S).
- Nixon v. Herudon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
'3 N'xon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (932).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
after, however, the Court, in Grovey v. Townsend, 4 refused to go so far as to
call that same discrimination, prescribed by the same committee without any
delegation of authority from the state, the action of the state.
When the scope of "state action" thus seemed to have been delineated, fresh
impetus was given the movement for nondiscriminatory suffrage by the Classic
decision,'s where, in extending the Constitutional "right to vote" to primary
elections at which candidates for national office were chosen, the Court cast
doubt on the validity of the Townsend decision. The extension of the "right to
vote" to include primary as well as genbral elections parallels the development
of greater state responsibility for free and equal voting. In the process of exten-
sion, the source of the right to vote-basic to all the suffrage cases and to the
whole pattern of attempted disfranchisement in the South-has become more
firmly established in the federal Constitution.
The underlying principle of the cases dealing with disfranchisement is that
rights derived from the national Constitution can be protected by federal law
against any encroachment, state or individual; but where the right derives from
the constitution and laws of the state the federal constitutional sanctions apply
only to "state action." Thus it was thought that the attempt in Nixon v.
Herndon 6 to discriminate in the primary was an attempt to regulate a right not
protected by the federal Constitution, but a right derived from state sover-
eignty. It is not questioned thatfthe right to vote at a purely state or municipal
election springs from the laws and constitution of the state itself.17 But the
state-derived right is a qualified one. The Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nine-
teenth Amendments place limitations upon the powers of the states in the
execution of their otherwise unlimited right to prescribe the qualifications of
voters in the election of state officers.' 8 No state may deprive any qualified voter
of the right to vote in any election, state, national, or municipal, because of
"race, color, or previous condition of servitude," or sex, or by providing an
unreasonable and arbitrary voting requirement.x9 Thus, the discrimination prac-
ticed in Nixon v. Herndon was struck down as "state action" without extending
the federal "right to vote." The case illustrates the yeoman duty which the
X4 295 U.S. 45 (x935).
is United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (i941).
16 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
17 Karem v. United States, 121 Fed. 250 (C.C.A. 6th, x9o3); United States v. Stone, 188
Fed. 836 (D.C. Md., 191i).
,8 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (194g); United States v. Stone, i88 Fed. 836 (D.C. Md.,
i9ix); Karem v. United States, 121 Fed. 250 (C.C.A. 6th, 9o3); cf. Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341, 359-60 (I943).
X" Although no case has arisen, it is presumed that such voting requirements as 15 years'
residence in the state and/or $io,ooo of property would violate the "reasonableness" standard
of the Fourteenth Amendment. But see Kallenbach, ConstitutionalAspects of Federal Anti-Poll
Tax Legislation, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 717, at 730 et seq. (1947). Professor Kallenbach apparently
believes that such requirements would not violate the suffrage amendments in the absence
of conflicting federal legislation.
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concept of "state action" has been called upon to perform-all that is required is
to find the tinge of state authority behind the discriminatory action.
The amendments which qualify state action, however, may not be invoked
against individual action."' In order to enforce Congressional sanctions against
an individual, the right violated must be shown to be derived from the national
government. So, when the "state action" concept seemed, in Grovey v. Townsend,
to have lost its stretching power, the only alternative left to the Negro voter was
to appeal to the courts for a declaration that his right to vote in a primary elec-
tion stemmed from the federal Constitution. Such a decision would protect him
from the discriminatory action of Democratic primary election officers who were
held not to be officers of the state. Consequently an action was brought in the
federal courts against Louisiana election officials for fraud in violating Sections
ig and 20 of the Criminal Code.21
The decision of the Supreme Court in that case, United States v. Classic,22 may
be called the genesis from which later cases, including the instant decisions,
have sprung. The Classic case clarified the derivation of the right to vote, and
gathered the primary election into the constitutional fold. It has long been
accepted law that the right to vote for representatives in Congress is conditioned
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.23 It is also established that in
the absence of Congressional legislation enacted in the exercise of such constitu-
tional powers, the right to vote for representatives in Congress is subject to
state regulation.24 A hazy conception of the latter doctrine has sometimes re-
sulted in the belief that the right to vote for representatives in Congress is
derived from the states.25 But the Classic opinion dispelled this notion with the
flat declaration that the right to elect national officers is derived from the na-
tional government and protected by Congressional enactment."1 The decision
20 Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. I (i9o6); United States v. Harris, io6 U.S. 629, 637
(1882); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); cf. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (r875).
2'35 Stat. 1092 (3go9), i8 U.S.C.A. §§ 51, 52 (1927), quoted note 9 supra.
- 313 U.S. 299 (i941).
23 Aczel v. United States, 232 Fed. 652 (C.C.A. 7th, igi6); Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347 (1915); Felix v. United States, 186 Fed. 685 (C.C.A. 5 th, 1iri); Exparte Yarbrough,
IIo U.S. 651 (z884).
24 Swaffordv. Templeton, x85 U.S. 487 (I9O2); Wileyv. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 64 (igoo); Ex
parteYarbrough, iioU.S. 651, 663 (1884).
25 See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937), where the statement appears that
"Privilege of voting is not derived from the United States, but is conferred by the state and,
save as restrained by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments and other provisions of the
Federal Constitution, the state may condition suffrage as it deems appropriate." And see
Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. (U.S.) 62, 170 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,
217-18 (1875); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1892).
2United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941): "While, in a loose sense, the right to
vote for representatives in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the states,
[cases cited note 25 supra] this statement is true only in the sense that the states are author-
ized by the Constitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by § 2 of Art. I, to the extent
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then extended the Congressional power to regulate elections to include primary
elections, setting forth, in a somewhat ambiguous manner, two situations which
warranted bringing the primary under the protection afforded by the federal
Constitution. These situations were held to exist x) when the primary was a
"necessary step" in the election process and/or 2) when the results of the pri-
mary were decisive at the general election.27 State law regulating the primary,
making the primary a "necessary step" in the elective process, was then found
to be the basis for overruling Grovey v. Townsend. In Smith v. Allwright the
Court held that- "when the primary is by law made an integral part of the
machinery for choosing officials, state and national.. ." action taken by the
Democratic Party at its state convention disqualifying Negroes from participat-
ing in the Democratic primary is state action within the meaning of the Fif-
teenth Amendment. 2  The freshly invigorated "state action" concept then
struck down a Georgia attempt at disfranchisement under the authority of the
Allwright case.29
The opinion of the circuit court in Rice v. Elmore, while concerned only with
state action, combines all that has gone before. The primary and election are in
fact merged, and the whole election is termed an inseparable "two-step process."
The primary stage, with or without regulatory law, and even apart from the
that Congress has not restricted state action by the exercise of its powers to regulate elections
under § 4 and under Article I, § 8, clause 18 of the Constitution."
27 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941): "The words of §§ 2 and 4 of Article I,
read in the sense which is plainly permissible and in the light of the constitutional purpose,
require us to hold that a primary election which involves a necessary step in the choke of candi-
dates for election as representatives in Congress, and which in the circumstances of this case
controls that choke, is an election within the meaning of the constitutional provision and is
subject to congressional regulation as to the manner of holding it." (Italics added.)
But in an earlier portion of the opinion, p. 318, the following statement appears: "Where
the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice, or where in
fact the primary effectively controls the choice, the right of the elector to have his ballot count-
ed at the primary is likewise included in the right protected by Art. I, § 2." (Italics added.)
Thus, it was not clear whether both conditions were necessary, or the presence of either
one was sufficient to put the prohibitions of the federal Constitution into play. This ambiguity
is reflected in the district and circuit court opinions in King v. Chapman, 62 F. Supp. 639 (Ga.,
;945), aff'd on other grounds 154 F. 2d 460 (C.C.A. 5th, 1946), cert. den. 327 U.S. 8oo (1946),
where the district court used the conclusive aspect of the Georgia primary and the circuit
court used the "necessary step" aspect to hold the primary an "election" within the meaning
of the Constitution; see note 29 infra. The same ambiguity is present in the decisions in Rice
v. Elmore. For comment on this point see Folsom, Federal Elections and the "White Primary,"
43 Col. L. Rev. 1026, io3o et seq. (1943); Berry, United States v. Classic, i Nat. B. J. 149
(x941); and Negro Disenfranchisement-A Challenge to the Constitution, 47 Col. L. Rev.
76, 83 (1947), where the holding is stated to be in the alternative.
28 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
"9 King v. Chapman, 62 F. Supp. 639 (Ga.; 1945), aff'd on other grounds 154 F. 2d 460
(C.C.A. 5th, 1946), cert. den. 327 U.S. 8oo (1946). It is interesting to note thatwhile the circuit
court in that case affirmed on the authority of Smith v. Allwright, the district court protected
the Negroes' right to vote in the Georgia Democratic primary on the ground that the primary
was an integral part of the electoral process of Georgia. This is the closest holding to the circuit
court opinion in Rice v. Elmore.
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controlling aspect of the primary, is thus an "election" within the meaning of
Article I, Sections 2 and 4 of the Constitution. By regulating the general election
by law the state gives effect to the choice at the primary. The state thus sanc-
tions the primary result, and the methods used in the primary, and must take
the responsibility for any discriminatory action practiced in the primary. Ac-
tion sanctioned by the state is held to be "state action."3o
It is to be noted that under the instant ruling and the Classic case the dis-
franchised Negro is not required to proceed against the state to obtain remedial
action. Prosecutions might also have been brought against Democratic Party
officials for depriving Negroes of their right to vote for candidates for national
office in violation of Sections 19 and 20 of the Criminal Code.3' Indeed, had
the Supreme Court refused to affirm the decision in Rice v. Elmore by extending
the state action concept so far32 an action against the Democratic Party of-
ficials would still have been available to the plaintiffs.33
The decision of the circuit court in the Rice case is a victory for free elections
in the South, though it came too late to affect the 1948 primary.4 It is certain,
however, that attempts will be made to circumvent the decision. Southern
legislators are already discussing-the possibility of abolishing the primary sys-
30 The authorities Judge Parker cites for this doctrine in the circuit court opinion are Steele
v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (i944), where it was held that a labor union which was
authorized by the Federal Railway Labor Act to represent a whole craft of employees could
not discriminate against Negro members of the craft; and Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library,
i49 F. 2d 212 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1945), holding that the trustees of a privately established library,
chartered and supplied with continuing funds by the state, were acting as representatives of
the state in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when they refused to admit a Negress to
the library training course. It is plain that Rice v. Elmore, where there is no implied statutory
duty, or supply of state funds, or charter, is a broader application of "state action" than either
of the cited cases. The doctrine of Rice v. Elmore could well bring restrictive covenants, un-
fair labor practices, and all union discrimination within the unconstitutional realm of "state
action."
The law seems to be working around to the position advanced by Justice Harlan in a lone
dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, Io 9 U.S. 3, 48 (1883). Invoking the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments, Justice Harlan found that the management of public conveyances, inns,
and theaters, maintained under the direct license of state law, was a "public matter" war-
ranting Congressional legislation forbidding racial discrimination by such management.
3' Note 9 supra.
32 One Supreme Court justice has declared that the state action concept is limited solely
to the direct exercise of government power; see the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter
in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 13 (r944).
33 The difficulty of obtaining convictions from southern juries for crimes committed against
Negroes makes this method a less satisfactory answer than the "state action" concept as used
in Rice v. Elmore. However, if resort must be had to the criminal indictment, this difficulty
would be obviated somewhat by the fact that the cases would be brought in the federal courts.
34 By availing themselves of the full measure of time allotted for the petitions for rehearing
in the circuit court and for certiorari in the Supreme Court, the state forestalled the
Supreme Court decision until after the 1948 summer primaries were run off. Under lis pendens
the circuit court decision did not constitute binding authority until the final disposition of
the appeal.
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tern and reestablishing the nominating convention.35 It is expected that nomina-
tion in convention-a favorite technique of machine control-will accomplish
by indirection that which is directly forbidden.36 But since the use of nominating
conventions disfranchises the white electorate as well as the Negro, it is a matter
of lively interest whether the South will go so far.
Even if the primary be maintained, the Negro faces a thorny road to the
polling booth. Literacy and character tests provide an almost insuperable ob-
stacleY7 And while the decision in Rice v. Elmore holds that a political party
may not discriminate on racial grounds in registering its electors, the party is
still free to adopt any platform it wishes and to demand that its members sup-
port that platform.35 And there is always the poll tax.3 9
Until a second party is established in the South, the extension of the federal
right to vote, which reaches individual as well as state action, and its imple-
mentation through federal legislation, offer the greatest promise of checking the
disfranchisement of Negroes in the South. The course of future action lies in
federal regulation of primaries and general elections for national offices, with
Congress prescribing the voting qualifications. The Constitutional basis for
such federallaws arises from the power given Congress to regulate the "manner"
of holding elections for national offices, 4° and from the line of decisions, already
discussed, which assert that the right to vote for federal officers is derived from
the Constitution. Such federal legislation could not reach discrimination prac-
35 Southern newspaper reports and editorials have freely discussed such a possibility, and
Herman Talmadge of Georgia is using the reestablishment of the nominating convention as a
plank in his political platform.
36 For an account of the workings and effects of the nominating convention see 4 Encyc.
Soc. Sci. 349 (1932), and references there cited.
37 Alabama's answer to Smith v. Allwright was the Boswell amendment to the state con-
stitution, requiring that all voters be "of good character," and be able to "read and write,
understand and explain any article of the Constitution of the United States in the English
language." There are further requirements that the duties and obligations of citizenship must
be understood. Ala. Acts 1945, No. 336, ratified by the voters in N6vember, 1946. It is sug-
gestedin a note in 47 Col.L.Rev. 76,at 95, (1947) that the doctrine of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, uX8
U.S. 356 (1886), be applied to such requirements as the "Boswell" amendment. The case
enunciated the principle that the Constitution prohibits partial administration of laws "fair on
their face."
38 The Mississippi plan of disfranchisement consists of requiring the would-be Democratic
Party elector to certify agreement with party principles, which include opposition to any anti-
poll tax law, anti-lynch law, etc. The elector must also swear accord "with the time-honored
and cherished traditions of the South." (Law passed at special session of legislature, Mar. 1,
1947) N.Y. Times, p. 6, col. 3 (Aug. 5, 1947).
39 For an exhaustive presentation of the constitutional problems presented by the poll
tax, see Kallenbach, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Anti-Poll Tax Legislation, 45 Mich. L.
Rev. 717 (I947).
4o Article I, § 4, note 8 supra. For comments favoring such an interpretation see Morrison,
The Pepper Bill (S. 128o) to Outlaw the Poll Tax in Federal Elections Is Constitutional,
2 Lawyers Guild Rev. i (Sept., U942); Boudin, Brief in Support of the Pepper Bill, 2 Lawyers
Guild Rev. ii (March, 1942).
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ticed in state and local elections,4' but this limitation makes the curtailment of
"legal" discrimination in federal elections none the less desirable.
CIVIL JURISDICTION TO REVIEW COURT-
MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS
The petitioner, a private in the United States Army, was tried and convicted
by an army general court-martial in Germany in April 1945 on charges of rape
and sodomy. The petitioner sought release from imprisonment by writ of
habeas corpus in a federal district court, claiming that the court-martial had
failed to acquire jurisdiction and that he had been denied due process of law.
The court, through examination of a transcript of the record of the trial, and
from oral testimony of an officer who had been connected with the proceedings,
found that in pre-trial examinations the accused, petitioner, was not present
at the interrogation of witnesses; that he was then confronted by witnesses
only during an informal "viewing" in which accused was lined up with other
soldiers and the witnesses were asked to identify the persons they thought had
committed the alleged attacks; that at no time during such examinations was
he informed of his right to, or given an opportunity to, cross-examine any of
the witnesses; that he was brought to trial two days after charges had been
served on him; that a medical officer who had never had any experience in de-
fending was appointed as his counsel and that he had only a short conversation
with this counsel before the trial; that he had expressed his desire to have as his
counsel a certain officer, known to have had experience in defending, and that
this officer was never obtained as counsel; and that witnesses requested by him
were not produced at the trial. The court held that by reason of failure to com-
ply with Article of War 70' with respect to pre-trial investigation, the court-
martial was without jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and granted a writ of
habeas corpus for his discharge from custody. Anthony v. Hunter.2
During periods of war, the prodigiously increased burden of administering
military law reveals inadequacies and inefficiencies which are not otherwise ap-
parent.3 The inevitable result of the necessity for speedy military justice ad-
ministered under the stress of wartime circumstances is the existence of shock-
ing miscarriages of justice and extreme severity of punishment. An equally in-
evitable aftermath of war is a deluge of litigation in the civil courts, in which
41 Arkansas has recognized this state of the law by separating the primaries for state and
federal officials. Ark. Acts 1945, c. 107, held constitutional in Adams v. Whitaker, r95 S.W.
2d 634 (Ark., 1946). But for a broader view see Professor Kallenbach's article, op. cit. supra
note 39, at 731 n. 48, where it is pointed out that constitutional support for the power of Con-
gress to nullify the poll tax in all elections could be held to stem from Article IV, Section 4 of
the Constitution, which guarantees a republican form of government to the states.
14' Stat. 802 (1920), IO U.S.C.A. § 1542 (1946).
2 71 F. Supp. 823 (Kan., 1947).
Rheinstein, Military Justice, in Puttkammer, War and the Law 155, 159 (i944).
